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A Well-Founded Fear of Being 
Persecuted … But When? 
Adrienne Anderson, Michelle Foster,† Hélène Lambert‡ and 
Jane McAdam§ 
Abstract 
It is well established that the ‘well-founded fear’ test in refugee law requires a 
prospective assessment of potential future harm. Yet, the requisite timeframe 
for this test is rarely examined. Analysis of jurisprudence across a wide range 
of jurisdictions reveals that Australian courts have been unusually cognisant of 
the question of timing of harm. Indeed, they have been particularly insistent 
that a flexible and longer-range assessment is appropriate, encapsulated by the 
‘reasonably foreseeable future’ test. This article provides an in-depth analysis 
of the principles set out by Australian courts and tribunals, and identifies 
particularly challenging contexts in which timing has played an important role. 
It also assesses the extent to which decision-makers at the tribunal level adhere 
to the flexible approach formulated by the judiciary. It is hoped that our 
analysis of Australian jurisprudence may prove helpful in other jurisdictions in 
which the issue of timing of harm is equally pertinent, but far less developed. 
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I Introduction 
The question whether an individual qualifies for refugee status turns on an 
assessment of his or her risk of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group. Assessing 
such risk is undertaken by reference to the ‘well-founded fear’ test contained in 
art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, which defines the term ‘refugee’.1 Given the 
broad and largely undefined terms in the definition, refugee status determination 
can be a highly contested undertaking, with credibility often at the core of 
decision-making.2 The absence of consistent ‘country of origin’ information and 
traditional evidentiary sources (especially witnesses), in conjunction with the 
forward-looking, speculative assessment of risk, means that refugee status 
determination constitutes a uniquely demanding fact-finding task.3 In this light, it 
is hardly surprising that the meaning of ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ 
has been extensively examined by courts and scholars alike. Around the world, 
courts have emphasised that the Refugee Convention ‘looks to the future’,4 and that 
‘a well-founded fear of future persecution is the touchstone of asylum’.5 Likewise, 
scholars agree that the test requires a forward-looking assessment of risk:6 it ‘is 
essentially an essay in hypothesis.’7 Yet, while it is acknowledged that ‘time is 
																																																								
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 
1967) (together ‘Refugee Convention’). Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee 
as a person who, 
owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it. 
2 Hilary Evans Cameron, Refugee Law’s Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018) 33. 
3 Ibid 35–8. 
4 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1,  
27 [74] (McHugh J) (‘S152/2003’). 
5 Camara v Attorney General (US), 580 F 3d 196, 202 (3rd Cir, 2009). 
6 Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 56: ‘the decision-maker must then make a reasoned guess as to the future’; 
James C Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 
2nd ed, 2014) 110: ‘the risk-oriented understanding of “fear” as forward-looking apprehension, and 
as mandating only a prospective appraisal of an applicant’s actual risk, is very much in accord with 
the underlying goals of the treaty’; Cornelis Wolfram Wouters, International Legal Standards for 
the Protection from Refoulement: A Legal Analysis of the Prohibitions on Refoulement contained in 
the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture (Intersentia, 2009) 83: ‘The 
element of risk stipulated by the words “well-founded fear” is the backbone of the refugee 
definition … . It implies that there needs to be a present or prospective risk of persecution which 
can objectively be established’; Andreas Zimmermann and Claudia Mahler, ‘Article 1 A, Para 2 
1951 Convention’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2011) 281, 338: ‘The 
object and purpose of the 1951 Convention thus supports an interpretation of the notion of “well-
founded fear” as forward-looking expectation of risk’. 
7 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 6) 54.  
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everywhere’ in refugee law,8 there is very little consideration in either the 
jurisprudence or the scholarship as to how far into the future the risk of persecution 
may extend for refugee protection to be forthcoming. On the one hand, it is 
impossible to develop any precise timeframe, since all refugee claims are 
necessarily contextual, with various factors weighted differently depending on the 
individual circumstances of the case. On the other hand, given how meticulously 
the concept of well-founded fear has been analysed, it is surprising that such 
limited attention has been paid to this question.9 
While caution ought to be exercised in circumscribing too closely an open-
ended phrase such as ‘well-founded fear’, the lack of guidance on the question of 
timing has allowed a notion of imminence — or immediacy of risk — to infiltrate 
refugee status determination silently across a wide range of jurisdictions. In some 
cases, this has resulted in the denial of protection where harm is not deemed 
sufficiently imminent to warrant protection under international human rights law.10 
In other cases, denial of protection is the result of a (mis)application of the Refugee 
Convention.11 Hence the concern to examine the question of timing of harm is not 
a mere academic exercise. 
Moreover, there are certain ‘types’ of contemporary protection cases in 
which the nearness in time of harm seems to play a critical role — such as those 
relating to the (future) impacts of climate change and to deterioration of health 
over time. Although the feared harm is not felt acutely now, it may have 
deleterious consequences in the future. In New Zealand (‘NZ’), for instance, a 
series of cases has begun to delineate the scope of refugee and human rights law to 
protect Pacific Islanders at risk of the negative impacts of climate change, disasters 
and environmental degradation.12 These kinds of cases inevitably require analysis 
																																																								
8 Bruce Burson, ‘The Concept of Time and the Assessment of Risk in Refugee Status Determination’ 
(Conference Paper, Kaldor Centre Annual Conference, 18 November 2016) 1 <http://www.kaldor 
centre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/B_Burson_2016_Kaldor_Centre_Annual_Conference.pdf>. 
See also at 2, 4. 
9 For the purposes of this article, the focus is refugee law. However, given the alignment of tests in 
the Australian context, the same analysis would apply to complementary protection cases. 
10 See Adrienne Anderson et al, ‘Imminence in Refugee and Human Rights Law: A Misplaced Notion 
for International Protection’ (2019) 68(1) International Comparative Law Quarterly 111. That 
article offers the first analysis of the notion of imminence in the jurisprudence on international 
protection from four supranational courts and international oversight bodies, namely, the United 
Nations (‘UN’) Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. It argues that although the 
number of cases that have engaged explicitly with the notion remains quite small, ‘it is nonetheless 
significant that it has been invoked at all, given that it does not appear to have a solid foundation in 
traditional principles of risk assessment in the law on international protection’: Anderson et al at 
124 (emphasis in original). It concludes with the urgent need for a greater understanding of the role 
of time in this area of law. 
11 In its full scope, our research project also considers jurisprudence from refugee status decision-
making in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand (‘NZ’), the United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
and the United States (‘US’). While important nuances exist between these jurisdictions, our 
general findings indicate imminent-like notions are used in the application of the well-founded fear 
test to varying degrees. The focus of this article, however, is the unusually sophisticated analysis of 
timing of harm in Australian case law compared to other jurisdictions. 
12 *AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517; AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413; AF (Tuvalu) [2015] 
NZIPT 800859; *BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 800091; Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of 
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of how far forward in time the assessment of risk may extend. Of course, in 
relation to climate-related displacement, it is important to acknowledge that 
refugee law will not be a good fit in most cases. The impacts of climate change 
and/or disasters generally will not satisfy the meaning of ‘persecution’ because of 
the need for human agency, and even if such harm could be characterised as 
persecution, a further challenge would be linking the persecution to one of the five 
Refugee Convention grounds. However, human rights-based protections from 
refoulement may apply, which prevent states from sending people to places where 
they face a real risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life, or subjected to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment. Since jurisprudence in this area often draws on 
refugee law principles by analogy, the capacity of refugee law to protect people 
from future risks may be highly relevant. Indeed, in the NZ cases, the notion of 
‘imminence’ was explicitly invoked,13 with the decision-maker observing that 
‘[i]mminence should not be understood as imposing a test which requires the risk 
to life be something which is … likely to occur’.14 Rather, it is comparable to the 
well-founded fear test in refugee law, requiring ‘no more than sufficient evidence 
to establish substantial grounds for believing the appellant would be in danger’.15 
That is why it is crucial to understand what the well-founded fear test entails. 
Australian decision-makers have grappled with the idea of future risk in a 
relatively sophisticated and nuanced way, compared to other jurisdictions.16 
Indeed, our analysis of decisions across a wide range of jurisdictions revealed a 
comparatively large number of Australian cases over the past 20 years — at both 
the Tribunal and court levels17 — in which the timing of harm was considered in 
some depth.18 The clear principle that emerges in Australian jurisprudence is that 
																																																																																																																																
Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZAR 162; Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry 
of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZAR 688; Teitiota v Chief Executive of the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107. Note that an asterisked (*) 
NZ case means that it is a precedent. Australian and NZ authorities have considered cases on this 
issue at least as far back as 1995, as discussed in Jane McAdam, ‘The Emerging New Zealand 
Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’ (2015) 3(1) Migration Studies 131. 
The UN Human Rights Committee followed the reasoning of the NZ tribunal and courts in Teitiota 
v New Zealand, UN doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (24 October 2019). 
13 EW v Netherlands, UN Doc CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990 (8 April 1993); Aalbersberg v Netherlands, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1440/2005 (12 July 2006). 
14 AF (Kiribati) (n 12) [90]. 
15 Ibid. See also AC (Tuvalu) (n 12) [57]. This was notwithstanding the Tribunal member’s recognition, 
in subsequent remarks given in a personal capacity, that in other areas of international law, such as 
self-defence, ‘imminence’ seems to envisage a very immediate timeframe for harm to materialise, 
and certainly more immediate than the real chance standard in refugee law: Burson (n 8) 7. 
16 This is the case in particular when compared with the jurisdictions mentioned above (nn 10–11). 
17 In this article, ‘Tribunal’ is used to describe decisions by both the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(Migration and Refugee Division) and its predecessor, the Refugee Review Tribunal. 
18 We identified 473 relevant Australian cases between 1996 and 2019 at either tribunal or court level 
as part of our broader ARC-funded imminence project. Approximately half of these cases 
concerned the question of timing of harm and were identified as relevant to this article because:  
(1) ‘imminence’ was used explicitly in the case (by the applicant or the decision-maker);  
(2) ‘imminence’ was used implicitly (through the use of synonyms such as ‘today’, ‘present’, 
‘immediate’, ‘short-term’, ‘near future’) in framing the timing of harm; or (3) timing of harm was 
otherwise very relevant to the outcome of the claim as evidenced by the facts of the case and/or 
because the decision-maker considered whether the harm would occur in the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable future’. We footnoted only those that identified key principles, implemented those 
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when examining whether a person has a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’, 
and thus requires international protection, the relevant timeframe for assessing risk 
is not the immediate future, but rather the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’.19 By 
contrast, our analysis of the implementation of the law of international protection 
in a range of international and regional jurisdictions has identified that the notion 
of ‘imminence’ — in the sense of immediacy of harm — has begun to infiltrate 
decision-making, sometimes explicitly, but, much more commonly, implicitly.20 
Our concern is that because the role and significance of time is rarely explicitly 
acknowledged or assessed in other jurisdictions, including in comparative domestic 
jurisdictions,21 there is potential for an ‘imminence test’ to slip into refugee status 
determination without critical reflection or examination.22 In this context, a critical 
appraisal of one of the few jurisdictions to have examined the issue of timing of 
harm explicitly, namely, Australia, is instructive and timely, given that cases 
involving a risk of harm that may take longer to materialise are increasingly likely 
to arise in assessing international protection obligations. 
There is no international tribunal or committee vested with jurisdiction to 
hear individual complaints or otherwise authoritatively dictate a common 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, meaning that refugee law has evolved 
mostly through the interpretation of national courts and tribunals.23 As such, the 
																																																																																																																																
principles, or, on the contrary, where a rejection was based at least in part on the absence of a 
foreseeable risk, and risk of harm in the future was not (adequately) considered.  
19 See, eg, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 279 
(Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ) (‘Wu Shan Liang’); SZQXE v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 134 ALD 495; MZACU v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection [2015] FCCA 486; AON15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 
269 FCR 184; CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134; 
DUX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1529 (‘DUX16’); DPM16 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 249 (‘DPM16’); ALV16 v Minister 
for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 626; CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection (No 4) [2018] FCCA 1169; EBZ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection [2019] FCCA 79. 
20 Anderson et al (n 10) 139. 
21 Our research reveals that the concept of imminence, in the sense of timing of future harm, has been 
invoked explicitly or implicitly in comparator jurisdictions, but with little or no analysis of the 
appropriateness or relevance of this factor. For example, in NZ decision-makers tend not to discuss 
future timeframes explicitly and, in many cases, the reasoning appears to indicate quite a 
circumscribed period of time as being the only period for assessing well-founded fear:  
BA (Afghanistan) [2017] NZIPT 801138; AH (Hungary) [2018] NZIPT 801172; DT (India) [2017] 
NZIPT 801159. In Canada, claims brought on the basis of a risk of female genital mutilation on 
return have sometimes been rejected because the harm was not assessed as likely to occur 
immediately on return: see, eg, Re X (Re) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee 
Protection Division, RPD File Nos TA6-04120 TA6-11916, Daniel G McSweeney, 1 August 2007) 
[2007] CanLII 80670; Re X (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Appeal Division, 
RAD File Nos TB7-11035 TB7-11036 TB7-11037 TB7-11038, Christine Houde, 2 January 2019) 
[2018] CanLII 64862. In the US, the language of imminent risk has been invoked to reject claims, 
see, eg, Hernandez-Jimenez v Sessions, 710 Fed Appx 257, 7 (7th Cir, 2018); Mejia-Ramos v Barr, 
934 F 3d 789 (8th Cir, 2019). In the UK, these issues have arisen particularly in the context of 
health deterioration: Anderson et al (n 10) 131–2. 
22 Anderson et al (n 10) 140. 
23 Hélène Lambert, ‘Transnational Law, Judges and Refugees in the European Union’ in Guy S Goodwin-
Gill and Hélène Lambert (eds), The Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization 
and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1, 4. 
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Australian approach to these issues offers particular insights that may have broader 
relevance.24 
Part II of this article explores briefly the concept of well-founded fear and 
its relevance to the timing of harm. Next Part III examines the Australian doctrinal 
position on the question of timing in more detail. Part IV identifies particular 
circumstances in which imminence is still implicitly or explicitly invoked by 
Australian decision-makers, especially at the tribunal level, despite superior rulings 
that this is not the correct approach. Finally, Part V analyses the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable future’ standard in Australian law, drawing out relevant principles and 
guidance that may assist in future refugee status adjudication. It should be noted at 
the outset that while ‘time’ is central to many aspects of refugee protection,25 this 
article focuses specifically on the relevance and significance of the timing of future 
harm in determining whether a person is assessed as having a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted. 
II The ‘Well-Founded Fear’ (or ‘Real Chance’) Test 
It is clear that the well-founded fear test in refugee law requires a prospective, 
forward-looking assessment. It ‘necessarily involve[s] a degree of speculation. No 
one knows with certainty what the future holds.’26 As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 
note, ‘a decision on the well-foundedness or not of a fear of persecution is … an 
attempt to prophesy what might happen to the applicant in the future, if returned to 
his or her country of origin.’27 The requirement that the fear be ‘well-founded’ 
speaks to the need for objective evidence that the fear is plausible and reasonable,28 
																																																								
24 Hélène Lambert, Jane McAdam and Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European 
Refugee Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Unlike many aspects of the refugee definition, 
which have been given a particular meaning under Australian statute, the well-founded fear test has 
not been domestically circumscribed. 
25 Anderson et al (n 10) 117–18. A practical example in the Australian context is the 2010 practice of 
the Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship in imposing a ‘freeze’ on 
claims by Hazara asylum seekers from Afghanistan (for six months) and asylum seekers from Sri 
Lanka (for three months) in order ‘to ensure that decision-making was based on up-to-date, accurate 
realistic information about the country circumstances in those two places’: Joint Select Committee on 
Australia’s Immigration Detention Network, Final Report (Report, March 2012) [6.46]–[6.48] 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Former_Committees/immigrati
ondetention/report/c06>. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Chris Bowen, acknowledged 
at the time that  
[a]s a result of the more exhaustive country information, there have [sic] been a decrease in the 
number of primary acceptances of claims from Afghans who are not subject to the processing 
pause. Even taking into consideration the possibility of some of these being overturned at 
review, the percentage of successful refugee claims is likely to be lower than in the past. 
‘Govt Lifts Freeze on Refugee Processing’, ABC News (online, 30 September 2010) 
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-30/govt-lifts-freeze-on-refugee-processing/2280450>. 
Such a ‘freeze’ illustrates the broader relevance of time in refugee status determination (albeit not 
specifically in the application of the well-founded fear test). 
26 Wu Shan Liang (n 19) 288 (Kirby J). 
27 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 6) 54. 
28 See ibid 64 and references there. As the US Board of Immigration Appeals has framed it, an 
individual’s fear of persecution ‘must have a solid basis in objective facts or events’: Matter of 
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec 211, 225–6 (BIA, 1985). See also Hathaway and Foster (n 6) 105: ‘The 
2020] WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF BEING PERSECUTED 161 
	
thus permitting the finding that the individual, in his or her particular 
circumstances, faces a real chance of being persecuted.29 Past harm may be 
relevant to, but not determinative of, future persecution.30 
A person’s fear can be ‘well-founded’ even if he or she ‘only has a 10% 
chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted’.31 In Australia, this 
approach is encapsulated by the ‘real chance’ test,32 which 
clearly conveys the notion of a substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, 
of persecution occurring … . If an applicant establishes that there is a real 
chance of persecution, then his fear, assuming that he has such a fear, is 
well-founded, notwithstanding that there is less than a 50 per cent chance of 
persecution occurring.33 
																																																																																																																																
existence of a “well-founded fear” of being persecuted requires only that there be a forward-
looking apprehension of risk, thus mandating a purely objective inquiry.’ 
29  The requisite degree of probability must take into account the intensity of the fear, the nature of 
the projected harm (death, imprisonment, torture, detention, serious discrimination, etc.), the 
general history of persecution in the home country, the applicant’s personal experience and that 
of his or her family, and all other surrounding circumstances. 
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), ‘Brief of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent’, Submission in 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca 85-782, 14 July 1986, 29 (United 
States) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b03c5818.html>. 
30 In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, 574–5 (‘Guo’), the 
majority stated that: 
Past events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have 
occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability — high or low — of 
their recurrence. The extent to which past events are a guide to the future depends on the 
degree of probability that they have occurred, the regularity with which and the conditions 
under which they have or probably have occurred and the likelihood that the introduction of 
new or other events may distort the cycle of regularity. 
See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, 26 [83] 
(McHugh J): ‘Past acts of persecution are usually strong evidence that the applicant will again be 
persecuted if returned to the country of his or her nationality. But the relevance of past acts of 
persecution depends upon the degree of likelihood that they or similar acts will occur in the future’. 
In S152/2003 (n 4) 27 [74] McHugh J noted:  
The Convention looks to the future. What has occurred in the past does not determine whether 
a person is a refugee for the purpose of the Convention. In determining whether that person has 
a well-founded fear that he or she will be persecuted if returned to the country of nationality, 
the past is a guide — a very important guide — as to what may happen. But that is all. 
In N00/35501 [2001] RRTA 582, the Tribunal stated: ‘My task is not, however, to dwell on the past. 
Rather, it is to make an assessment about whether the applicants face a real chance of persecution in 
the future. In making this assessment I must necessarily draw on the events in the past’. 
31 Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 440 (Stevens J) (1987). 
See also Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v MOK (1994) 55 FCR 
375, 407 (Sheppard J) (‘MOK’): ‘The chance spoken of is a chance that is less than 50 per cent and 
one which may be as low as 10 per cent.’ 
32 Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, 389 (Mason CJ), 398 
(Dawson J), 406–7 (Toohey J), 427–29 (McHugh J) (‘Chan’). Like in Australia, a well-founded 
fear test is required in other jurisdictions and is expressed as a ‘real chance’ test (such as in NZ and 
the UK), ‘reasonable possibility’ test (such as in Canada and the US) or ‘crainte avec raison’ test 
(such as in France), all requiring a forward-looking assessment. For an overview of this standard in 
different jurisdictions, see Hathaway and Foster (n 6) 113. See also Anderson et al (n 10). 
33 Chan (n 32) 389 (Mason CJ), referring also to Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10, 21 
(Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ). See 1404760 [2014] RRTA 769, [24]: ‘while “anything could 
happen in the future” and that “bombs and explosions could occur anywhere at any time”… [the 
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This is an appropriately liberal test that reflects the protective objective of the refugee 
definition and the inherent challenges involved in establishing a future risk of 
persecution with any certainty.34 In our view, it appears capable of accommodating a 
longer timeframe assessment of future risk, and is therefore able to encompass 
evolving, slower-onset harms that may present less immediate, but no less serious, 
threats. In this regard, it is interesting to consider a more general observation by the 
Federal Court of Australia on the relationship between time and harm: 
All other factors remaining the same, the chance of harm will tend to 
multiply proportionally to the time spent exposed to it. In other words, the 
longer a person is exposed to a source of harm, the more likely it is that at 
some stage the person will encounter that harm. In that way, even a risk that 
on its face is remote or fanciful, may increase through prolonged exposure 
such that the level of risk becomes real.35 
Part III, below, examines the approach of Australian courts and tribunals 
with respect to how far into the future a risk may extend for protection to be 
warranted. 
III The Australian ‘Reasonably Foreseeable Future’ Test: 
Looking ‘Not Only to the Hills but Also to the 
Horizon’36 
As early as 1996, the High Court of Australia endorsed the ‘reasonably foreseeable 
future’ test to assess a ‘real chance’ of harm.37 It did not engage in a detailed 
analysis of its meaning, but simply noted that the approach taken by the Tribunal 
was correct (namely, whether there was a real chance that the applicant ‘would be 
persecuted for a Convention reason were he to return at this time or within the 
reasonably foreseeable future’).38 The Federal Court of Australia has since held 
that a decision-maker who considers only ‘the present or immediate future’, as 
distinct from ‘the reasonably foreseeable future’, falls into jurisdictional error.39 
The ‘question of harm in the reasonably foreseeable future is a mandatory relevant 
consideration’,40 and failure to consider it is a reviewable error of law. Thus, a 
decision-maker cannot simply consider ‘future possibilities over a very short, 
future time frame’, but must ‘prognosticate the situation into the reasonably 
																																																																																																																																
Tribunal must] base its decision on the information before it and assess whether the chance of an 
event occurring in the reasonably foreseeable future is real or remote’. See also 1214267 [2013] 
RRTA 168, [127]. 
34 Anderson et al (n 10) 119.  
35 AEN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 509, [29]. See also Matthew 
Scott, Climate Change, Disasters, and the Refugee Convention (Cambridge University Press, 2020) 
107: ‘the predicament of being persecuted is best understood as a condition of existence, permeated 
by risk and potentially punctuated by acts of persecution or other serious denials of human rights 
that reflect and reinforce that predicament’. 
36 AOX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 132, [24] (‘AOX16’). 
37 Wu Shan Liang (n 19) 279 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
38 Ibid. 
39 MZYXR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 141 ALD 276, 283 [22] (‘MZYXR’). 
40 DUX16 (n 19) [22]. 
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foreseeable future’,41 which involves ‘an assessment of the period of time to look 
into the future’.42 
The most pertinent examination of the meaning of ‘reasonably foreseeable 
future’ was undertaken by Mortimer J in the 2017 Federal Court case of CPE15 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection: 
The ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ is something of an ambulatory period of 
time, but the use of reasonable foreseeability as the benchmark concept 
indicates that the assessment is intended to be one which can be made on the 
basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork. It is also 
intended to preclude predictions of the future that are so far removed in 
point of time from the life of the person concerned at the time the person is 
returned to her or his country of nationality as to bear insufficient connection 
to the reality of what that person may experience.43 
In essence, the assessment must be contextual. The ‘reasonably foreseeable 
future’ cannot be confined to any particular timeframe; it is a relative notion that 
will depend on the circumstances of each individual case. The further away in time 
the risk, the more probative the evidence needs to be that the particular individual 
is at risk.44 However, an applicant who fears harm in the more distant future does 
not have to provide a higher quality of evidence, and nor does the standard of proof 
change, regardless of the length of that period. There must also be a degree of 
flexibility, as suggested by Kirby J’s observations in Guo: 
The places from which refugees normally flee rarely have legal or 
administrative systems that permit the rational and consistent application of 
logic which our courts like to boast of but sometimes themselves fail to 
provide. To say this is not to intrude into assessment of the merits or to 
impose a conclusion about likely events in any particular country. It is 
simply to accept the inherent unpredictability of the future and the special 
difficulties which arise in assessing accurately the possible course of 
political or other oppression in the kinds of countries from which refugees 
typically come.45 
																																																								
41 QAAH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 145 FCR 363, 
391 [108] (‘QAAH’). Although this case concerned cessation of refugee status under art 1C(5) of 
the Refugee Convention, rather than consideration of the refugee definition per se, similar 
principles apply in both contexts. 
42 AON15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 184, 196 [50]. 
43 CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591, [60] (Mortimer J) 
(‘CPE15’). 
44 By way of analogy, the Court of Justice of the European Union has explained that in situations of 
generalised violence, ‘the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by 
reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate 
violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection’: Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie (C-465/07) [2009] ECR I-00921, I-955 [39]. 
45 Guo (n 30) 596 (Kirby J). See also Kirby J in Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 79 ALJR 1142, 1158 [93]: 
That risk would need to be judged by reference not only to current political and religious 
conditions in Iran but also to possible future conditions. Those conditions might change; not 
necessarily for the better. These questions were not considered explicitly by the second 
Tribunal, although clearly raised by the appellant’s reference to the dangers of return to Iran 
for an apostate Muslim like himself. They are crucial in judging whether his ‘fear’ of 
persecution is ‘well-founded’. 
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In this regard, a decision-maker’s choice of, and willingness to engage with, 
country-of-origin information that speaks to future trends or trajectories of harm 
may be central to the outcome.46 
A decision-maker is not required to refer explicitly to the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable future’ since that language is not used in the legislation.47 Conversely, 
however, merely referring to the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ is not sufficient to 
discharge the decision-maker’s duty to consider it.48 As the Federal Court held in 
BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Tribunal’s mention 
of ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ did 
no more than set out the test. It is a bare assertion that is insufficiently 
explained and lacks logical connection to the material and analysis that 
precedes it. There is no consideration by the Tribunal of what may happen 
after the completion of the withdrawal of foreign troops and of how the 
country information demonstrates that the appellant does not face a real 
chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. Its focus on the near completion of the withdrawal of 
foreign troops looks to the past and present and, possibly, to the near future, 
and not to the reasonably foreseeable future.49 
Likewise, it is not necessarily determinative if a decision-maker refers to ‘current 
risk’ and uses only the present tense (as opposed to referring to ‘future risk’ and/or 
phrasing the assessment in the future tense).50 The requirement is that a prospective 
assessment is made in substance, regardless of the ‘manner of expression’.51 
																																																								
46 Ministerial Direction No 84 — Consideration of Protection Visa Applications (24 June 2019), 
made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), requires the Tribunal to take account of 
available relevant country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (Cth) ‘expressly for protection status determination purposes’ (at [3]). See also BOR15 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 152, [43]; 1213438 [2012] RRTA 
1043; 1216090 [2013] RRTA 213, where the Tribunal preferred information that spoke to the 
future, rather than just the current situation. In 1215874 [2013] RRTA 58 the decision-maker relied 
on predicted future harm, giving weight to independent evidence and finding that ‘the situation 
regarding the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is volatile and fragile and can be described 
metaphorically as a “time bomb.” I find this is not mere fanciful speculation but is an assessment 
based on factual evidence.’ (at [140]), and that the security situation, ‘rather than diminishing, is on 
the rise’ (at [145]). Contrast this with 1517729 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 3034 [15], where the 
Tribunal found that a claim by a Chinese applicant was too speculative, where the applicant was 
separated from his wife, but feared violating the family planning policy in the future if he remarried 
and had more children. See also 1703287 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 409, [27]. 
47 CDW18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 270, [16] (‘CDW18’). See also at [29]:  
‘The reasons read as a whole indicate that the Authority was assessing what might happen on 
return, including into the future.’ See also CDW18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2334, 
[26]–[28]. 
48 CDW18 (n 47) [20]. See also BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] 
FCA 654, [59] (‘BOT15’). 
49 BOT15 (n 48) [59]. See also AIE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 
610, [34] (‘AIE15’). 
50 See AOX16 (n 36) [15], [21], [24], in which the Court was not persuaded that the Tribunal’s 
exclusive use of the present tense indicated that the reasonably foreseeable future had not been 
considered. See also BYH16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2051; cf cases where the 
Court found that the Tribunal’s present-tense expression pointed to a focus only on the past and 
present: BKD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3182 (‘BKD17’); 
DRO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3547 (‘DRO17’). But in 
some cases, the use of the future tense enabled the Court to find that the Tribunal had carried out its 
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Thus, in all cases, a decision-maker must carefully assess the applicant’s 
claim in light of what might occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, regardless 
of what terminology he or she uses.52 
IV Challenges in Implementation 
Notwithstanding that superior courts have been clear that decision-makers ought to 
consider a longer timeframe in assessing well-founded fear, extensive examination 
of the case law reveals ongoing challenges in practice. Indeed, in particular 
contexts, the most prominent of which are examined below, the notion of 
imminence or immediacy of harm still features in the reasoning of Australian 
decision-makers. 
A Imminence and Credibility 
One of the most striking contexts in which imminence continues to be invoked is 
where the decision-maker undertakes a retrospective assessment of the applicant’s 
departure, often as a method of assessing credibility and/or the question of 
subjective fear. 
This is particularly common at the tribunal level. There are dozens of 
decisions (including some very recent ones) in which the Tribunal’s reasoning 
identifies whether an applicant’s delay in leaving the country of origin, travel 
through a third country without claiming asylum, and/or delay in applying for 
protection in Australia was inconsistent with an imminent (risk of) harm. This 
tends to imply that an imminent risk at the point of departure is necessary in order 
to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. Applicants’ claims have been 
erroneously rejected where the decision-maker has based the decision on past 
events without substantively assessing the applicant’s fear into the reasonably 
foreseeable future.53 
There are a number of decisions refusing protection where the alleged delay 
(equated to a lack of immediacy of harm) has led to an inference that an applicant 
																																																																																																																																
assessment prospectively: BJU15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 
1296; AQK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3584. 
51 AOX16 (n 36) [24]. 
52 SZGHS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1572, [3] (‘SZGHS’); AIE15 (n 49) [33]. 
53 By way of example, in DRO17 (n 50) [30] the Court found the Tribunal to have erred where it 
‘assessed the future prospects of harm simply on the basis of what view the authorities had at [the 
time of his departure]. There was, in other words, no reasonable speculation as to what might occur 
in the future’. Cf 1005911 [2010] RRTA 923, where the Tribunal acknowledged, and avoided, the 
potential for error. The Tribunal found, at [64] and [104], that the applicant’s actions in returning to 
his country of former habitual residence and his delay in applying for protection in Australia were 
inconsistent with him facing ‘imminent harm’ at that time, but went on to state at [105]: ‘However 
the Tribunal must look, not merely to the immediate, but to the reasonably foreseeable future.’ The 
Tribunal ultimately concluded that the applicant would face persecution on cumulative (largely 
socio-economic) grounds, including some forms of harm that would manifest further into the future 
such as difficulty finding work which might compromise his ability to subsist. 
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lacked genuine subjective fear or credibility.54 For example, in 1514886 (Refugee), 
the Tribunal stated that: 
The applicant sought protection in Australia, after many years of visiting this 
country, because there is greater acceptance of LGBT people and more 
favourable lifestyle options compared with Fiji. His family and personal 
circumstances influenced the timing of this decision. He did not leave Fiji in 
response to any past persecution or significant harm, or any imminent fear 
that he would be subject to such harm.55 
Similarly, in 1101896, the Tribunal found, in relation to credibility, 
that if the applicant was indeed under the threat of imminent harm, he would 
not have waited four months before applying for a protection visa. For [this 
and] all the above reasons, the Tribunal does not find the applicant to be a 
credible, truthful and reliable witness.56 
The Tribunal has also made numerous similar findings in relation to a lack 
of ‘urgent fear’, which may, in some cases, be considered a proxy for imminence.57 
In only one such case invoking urgency was the applicant granted protection 
because it was accepted that she still had a well-founded fear of being persecuted, 
notwithstanding doubts as to her credibility.58 The Tribunal observed that the 
notable delay in the applicant’s protection visa application and the weakly 
argued reasons for that delay … indicate[d] that the applicant’s otherwise 
genuine fears were not as deeply and urgently held as exaggeratedly 
presented to the Tribunal.59 
Ultimately, however, it concluded that 
the applicant was genuinely but not urgently motivated to leave her country 
of origin based on [a relevant] incident for reasons of safety. Therefore, the 
applicant did have a genuine personally-held fear of serious harm at the time 
																																																								
54 In some cases, lack of credibility or subjective fear on this basis formed at least part of the reasons 
for rejection. While in three of these cases it appears that the applicant claimed to fear imminent 
harm, in the rest the Tribunal itself introduced the concept of imminence or immediacy: see, eg, 
V97/08193 [2000] RRTA 196; N01/39734 [2003] RRTA 137; N02/42403 [2003] RRTA 272; 
0800904 [2008] RRTA 99; 071959605 [2008] RRTA 256; 0808521 [2009] RRTA 270; 1000095 
[2010] RRTA 371; 1009089 [2011] RRTA 17; 1103103 [2011] RRTA 592; 1101896 [2011] RRTA 
401; 1101401 [2011] RRTA 620; 1205487 [2012] RRTA 710; 1103936 [2013] RRTA 857; 
1218579 [2013] RRTA 741; 1403634 [2014] RRTA 230; 1305041 [2014] RRTA 378; 1406956 
[2014] RRTA 894; 1301484 [2015] RRTA 98; 1600083 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 3066; 1611485 
(Refugee) [2018] AATA 4213; 1514886 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 3849; 1514689 (Refugee) [2018] 
AATA 3629. 
55 1514886 (Refugee) (n 54) [60] (emphasis added). In this case, while noting that it was not 
necessarily determinative, the Tribunal considered that the applicant’s ‘migration history 
significantly weaken[ed] his claims to have experienced persecution or significant harm in Fiji ... ; 
and to fear such harm if he returns there in the future’: at [21]. 
56 1101896 (n 54) [90]–[91]. 
57 See, eg, 1617430 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 4977; 1602952 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 4556; 1608643 
(Refugee) [2018] AATA 3630; 1500744 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 3094; 1501478 (Refugee) [2017] 
AATA 2732; 1616021 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2204; 1606474 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2216; 
1612947 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 2681; 1606330 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 3187; 1507725 
(Refugee) [2018] AATA 3775. All but one of these cases was decided by the same decision-maker.  
58 1507725 (Refugee) (n 57). 
59 Ibid [53]. 
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of her departure and at the time she applied for a protection visa, as well as 
now and into the foreseeable future.60 
It is not possible to assess whether, and to what extent, this reasoning is 
invoked at the departmental stage of decision-making since such decisions are not 
published. However, some tribunal decisions indicate that the Department is also 
using imminence in assessing credibility and/or subjective fear.61 For example, in 
1504740 (Refugee), the Tribunal noted that: 
The applicant and his wife could neither afford not to work nor take their 
children to a childcare centre for they feared for their safety as their 
circumstances and the threats prevented them from continuing to attend 
school. The Department incorrectly interpreted the applicants’ actions as 
evidence the family did not face imminent danger and the children were safe 
at home. On the contrary the children could not go to school as there were 
threats to kidnap them.62 
In another matter, the applicant argued that a similar finding on delay by the 
departmental delegate was ‘inconsistent with the Convention which does not 
require that a person be in immediate trepidation’.63 The Tribunal did not address 
this argument in its reasoning, although the case was successful on other grounds. 
The Tribunal’s reasoning on credibility and the absence of imminent 
fear/risk has received very little attention by the courts. Despite being set out in 
some decisions, it has not been the subject of review and it has only rarely been 
commented on.64 
References to imminent danger or fear at time of flight are problematic. 
These notions are not contained in the Refugee Convention, or in established 
jurisprudence on the meaning of well-founded fear. Yet, their invocation in the 
cases discussed above suggests that some applicants are being required to show 
that they left on account of an imminent risk of harm in order to establish at least 
																																																								
60 Ibid [69]. 
61 In at least 23 cases, the Tribunal’s reasoning reveals that the departmental delegate had raised an 
issue relating to lack of immediacy of the applicant’s fears. Of these 23, the Tribunal nevertheless 
went on to make a positive decision in 12 cases. In four cases it rejected the claim, at least in part, 
on the basis of delay or return to country of origin; in others the rejection related to other reasons. 
See also AYT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 688; BPC16 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1140. 
62 1504740 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 868, [43] (emphasis added).  
63 1407181, 1407173 [2015] RRTA 140, [15]. 
64 See, eg, BDT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 249; SZVSE v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1435; DTJ16 v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2049; DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection (2017) 317 FLR 215; FIG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
[2018] FCCA 3751. But see Applicant MZKAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1484, [35], where the Federal Court did expressly consider and 
approve of the Tribunal’s reasoning:  
This point can be dealt with shortly. It is clear that the appellant’s voluntary return to India on 
three occasions is relevant to assessing whether and to what extent the appellant fears 
persecution or ‘serious harm’ in India. The fact that the appellant was prepared to return there 
more than once strongly suggests that the fear he held, if any, was either not a fear of 
immediate harm or not a fear of treatment that would amount to ‘serious harm’. 
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one component of the well-founded fear test (namely, subjective fear).65 Although 
less frequent elsewhere, there are also instances in Canada, the United States 
(‘US’) and NZ where protection has been denied for this reason.66 
The fundamental problem with this approach is that refugee status 
determination is a prospective exercise in which an assessment must be made of 
future risk. As such, it should not matter whether the risk at the time of flight was 
urgent — or even in existence. Yet, the reasoning in this line of cases incorrectly 
implies that there is a right and a wrong time to leave, and that the Tribunal is in a 
position to determine whether the applicant chose the right time. 
The language (and notion) of imminence should therefore be discarded in 
the context of reviewing the trajectory of an applicant’s experience prior to flight, 
as it may distract a decision-maker from the core function of assessing the well-
founded fear of persecution in the future (which, in any event, is largely an 
assessment of objective risk of future harm). 
B Imminence and the Assessment of Future Harm 
The notion of imminence remains prevalent in assessing future harm even though 
it is clear that the well-established test of ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ for 
assessing well-founded fear in Australian refugee law requires a longer-frame 
assessment (see Part III). In some decisions, applicants themselves argued that they 
faced imminent risk or harm.67 However, more concerning is the fact that the 
Tribunal has rejected claims on the basis that there was no risk of harm arising 
from any ‘imminent’ event or circumstance.68 
The Australian Government’s Procedures Advice Manual (‘PAM3’) advises 
that ‘[h]ow far into the future a decision-maker should consider in terms of future 
harm (i.e., the real chance of persecution) will vary depending on the 
circumstances in the receiving country’, spanning from ‘a period as short as a week 
																																																								
65 See generally Hathaway and Foster (n 6) 100–2, 150–4. 
66 See, eg, Re X (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Refugee Appeal Division, RAD File No 
TB7-24034, G Erauw, 6 November 2018) [2018] CanLII 143642, [16]; Pang v Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 448 F3d 102 (2nd Cir, 3 May 2006) 104 [17]. In NZ, see  
CX (China) [2017] NZIPT 801141 [58]; Refugee Appeal No. 75402 [2006] NZRSAA 40; Refugee 
Appeal No. 73504 [2003] NZRSAA 90. 
67 See, eg, 0908758 [2010] RRTA 227; N01/41067 [2002] RRTA 1127; N06/53069 [2006] RRTA 88; 
N99/30512 [2000] RRTA 404; 1213207 [2012] RRTA 1078; 1610107 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 
1429; 1514117 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 1362; 1511167 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 1524; 1504584 
(Refugee) [2017] AATA 650; 1606403 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 2615; SZTBD v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 2182; BDF15 v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection [2015] FCCA 3014; CCX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
[2016] FCCA 1307. See also, in four cases, the applicant referred to the imminence of a harm-
causing event (war), rather than the harm itself: V00/11087 [2002] RRTA 92; N00/33037 [2001] 
RRTA 879; 0908758 (n 67); 1512717 (Refugee) [2017] AATA 212. 
68 See, eg, N06/53217 [2006] RRTA 58; N03/45607 [2003] RRTA 961; N99/30760 [2000] RRTA 399; 
N01/36945 [2001] RRTA 536; N98/21019 [2000] RRTA 730; 1215644 [2013] RRTA 377; 1213201 
[2013] RRTA 113; N02/45124 [2003] RRTA 1054; 1722737 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 643. 
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or month (possibly even days)’ to ‘more than a year’.69 It is, with respect, difficult 
to understand how the test of ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ could plausibly be 
satisfied by an assessment that considered a window confined to just one week. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which it would be appropriate to 
consider only a few days or a week into the future. In reality, what might vary is 
the period of time in which it is claimed (or the facts indicate) that harm may 
actually occur. For example, the evidence may point to a risk of immediate harm, 
such as arrest at the airport. However, that is an evidentiary, or factual, question, 
and in cases where the decision-maker finds that there is a real chance that this risk 
may eventuate immediately, it may be a simple decision. However, that may not 
always be the appropriate window of time for the decision-maker in similar cases. 
Were there to be a finding that risk would not eventuate in the short-term, further 
enquiry should not be foreclosed. Rather, in most cases, the decision-maker should 
go on to consider a period of time after return, in the event that the person is not 
arrested immediately or is released, but subsequently arrested (and that such 
treatment (cumulatively) amounts to persecution). 
In situations where the Tribunal has improperly focused only on the current 
or present risk, the courts have been willing to intervene. There are numerous cases 
in which an appeal has been successful on this ground.70 However, despite lucid 
and coherent authority emanating from the superior courts, it has not always been 
followed by the Tribunal.71 Furthermore, the possibility of review decreases as one 
moves through the hierarchy, such that only a small percentage of cases reach 
judicial review stage, underlining the importance of the merits review stage. 
In sum, the question of the timing of harm and the relevance of 
‘imminence’ to assessing future harm remains problematic, at least at the tribunal 
level. This is despite the High Court of Australia signalling an expansive approach 
to assessing well-founded fear over 20 years ago. As a concern that has largely 
gone unnoticed in the scholarship to date, it is hoped that by drawing out the 
issues, this article can contribute to a more coherent and principled approach. 
																																																								
69 Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Procedures Advice Manual 3: Refugee and 
Humanitarian — Refugee Law Guides (1 July 2017) [7.2] (‘PAM 3’). These guidelines are not 
formally binding on decision-makers, but are generally followed unless inconsistent with the 
Migration Act or Regulations. In 1215016 [2013] RRTA 169, [104] the Tribunal regarded the 
following year as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’, noting that such a timeframe was ‘not 
qualitatively any more speculative than an assessment of the situation at present.’ (citations 
omitted). See also 1214267 [2013] RRTA 168, [127]. The Tribunal has its own, brief, guidance on 
the meaning and application of ‘reasonably foreseeable future’: Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 
Migration and Refugee Division (Cth), A Guide to Refugee Law in Australia (2020) 3-8–3-9. 
70 See, eg, BKD17 (n 50); DRO17 (n 50); AOO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
[2016] FCCA 2871; MZZXD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 104 
(‘MZZXD’); SZTFI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 222; SZTUI 
v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1667 (‘SZTUI’); Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431 (‘MZYTS’); MZYXR (n 39); 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQKB (2012) 133 ALD 495; MZYAY v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 109 ALD 498; SZGHS (n 52); NACZ v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 457 (‘NACZ’). 
71 We found only one decision that referred to Mortimer J’s discussion of the ‘reasonably foreseeable 
future’ test in CPE15 (n 43), namely 1703914 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 3088, [87]. 
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V Understanding ‘Reasonably Foreseeable Future’ 
Even though there is some inconsistency in assessing risk prospectively, on the 
whole Australian courts and tribunals have engaged with the question of timing of 
harm more closely than any other jurisdiction we have examined, including by the 
United Nations (‘UN’) Committee against Torture, the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, and in other countries.72 
A decision-maker’s willingness to engage with this question may be the 
difference between a positive and negative outcome for an applicant who fears 
persecution. A comparative analysis of claims in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and 
Australia concerning possible political violence in upcoming elections illustrates 
the point.73 In EM, the UK Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 
considered (and rejected) the reasoning in an Australian decision on ‘reasonably 
foreseeable future’ that gave credence to ‘reasonable speculation’,74 finding instead 
that ‘the further away the elections, the more uncertain are their consequences’.75 
The UK Upper Tribunal explained: ‘[t]he combined effect of the evidential 
uncertainty of when elections may be called and what might happen when they are 
produces a picture that is too equivocal or obscure to amount to a real risk of future 
ill treatment.’76 
By contrast, the Federal Court of Australia found, in relation to an appeal by 
a Fijian applicant, that the Tribunal had erred in confining its enquiry to the 
immediate future when elections were due to occur sometime after the immediate 
period upon return. The Court considered that 
there was a failure to address the reasonably foreseeable future in the context 
of the claims made. The dealing with the three incidents was based on 
immediate facts — no elections looming and the character of the present 
government. This reflected a focus on immediacy which was no real 
assessment of whether in the future, with elections looming, with the first 
																																																								
72 See Anderson et al (n 10). 
73 At the time of the UK decision, the election date had not yet been set. This was a crucial factor in 
the decision, even though the elections were predicted to take place the same year or the year 
following the decision:  
If, after promulgation of this determination, evidence emerges that elections will be held at a 
particular time, without any of the safeguards and other countervailing features we have 
described, then the structures underpinning the country guidance system ensure that judicial 
fact-finders will be required to have regard to the new state of affairs, in reaching 
determinations on Zimbabwe cases. 
EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC), [265]. 
74 Australian case law was raised by counsel at ibid [250]: 
Mr Henderson also relied upon the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Karanakaran [2000] EWCA 
Civ 11. In particular, he drew attention to what the Court had to say in that case about the 
Australian decision of Sackville J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v 
[Rajalingam] [1999] FCA 719 [(1999) 93 FCR 220]. The thrust of the Australian decision, 
according to Mr Henderson, was that the decision maker in a case involving a claim to 
international protection must not foreclose reasonable speculation about the chances of a future 
hypothetical event occurring. 
75 Ibid [263]. 
76 Ibid [264]. 
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appellant campaigning for the FLP, he would not face a similar beating for 
the same reasons, or threats from elements of the Taukei Movement who 
had already targeted him.77 
Parts V(A)–(E), below, identify key principles that emerge from decades of 
Australian jurisprudence on the meaning of ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ in the 
context of assessing risk. These principles have the potential to provide guidance to 
other jurisdictions, as well as in relation to emerging protection claims that raise 
issues of timing particularly acutely. Part V(A) analyses the different time periods 
that have been considered in the cases generally, while Parts V(B)–(E) briefly 
reflect on four contexts where a longer timeframe may be particularly appropriate: 
namely, claims concerning children, slow-onset environmental harm, armed 
conflict, and health deterioration. 
A What Time Periods Have Been Considered? 
Consistent with the notion that a well-founded fear of persecution involves an 
apprehension of future risk, the past may be a guide,78 but the assessment of risk 
must always be forward-looking from the date of the determination. In particular, 
this assessment must look beyond the ‘very short, future time frame’ into the 
‘reasonably foreseeable future’.79 However, the ‘temporal limits embodied in the 
notion of reasonably foreseeable future are unclear’.80 For instance, in overturning 
a tribunal decision that had rejected a refugee claim because the applicant had 
remained safe in the two to three months prior to flight, the Federal Circuit Court 
of Australia stressed that ‘the future was not a short closed period but an indefinite 
period’.81 
This understanding of an open-ended notion of time when assessing 
‘reasonably foreseeable future’ is present in other cases too. For instance, the 
Federal Circuit Court has suggested that ‘the future tense [should be used] in an 
																																																								
77 SZGHS (n 52) [28]. See also 1404682 [2014] RRTA 893, [33], where the Tribunal took into 
account risk attendant on a future election: 
The Tribunal is mindful too that the applicants avoided harm between August 2010 and their 
departure to Australia in March 2013. It notes though Mr S remains a politician. Although the 
applicants did not make this claim and the migration agent did not submit it, the past harm the 
applicants experience[d] were temporal to election cycles in Sri Lanka in the beginning of 
(presidential) and mid (parliamentary) 2010. The Tribunal considers there is some chance and 
that is more than speculative or remote chance during any future election cycle, Mr S will 
again take steps to silence any perceived opponents, including the first named applicant. The 
Tribunal finds the first named applicant will continue to hold his pro-opposition, anti-
government and anti-corruption political opinion. The Tribunal finds in the reasonably 
foreseeable future, the threat to the first named applicant from Mr S is ongoing if the applicants 
return to Sri Lanka, as may be presidential elections in early 2015. 
78 Guo (n 30) 574–5. 
79 QAAH (n 41) 391 [108]. See also discussion above in Part III. 
80 V03/16047 [2004] RRTA 11. See also V03/16046 [2004] RRTA 15; V03/16249 [2004] RRTA 31; 
V03/16433 [2004] RRTA 349; V04/16763 [2004] RRTA 530; V03/16303 [2004] RRTA 33; 
V03/16260 [2004] RRTA 32. 
81 SZSZO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 242, [32]. 
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unconfined way’ when making findings about what might happen to an individual 
on return, rather than focusing on a ‘looming event’.82 
But how indefinite or unconfined is this future period? 
Very few cases circumscribe a concrete time period, although a number of 
cases have contemplated ‘a period of some years’.83 For instance, in AUK15 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the decision-maker considered 
that the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ could encompass the next two to three 
years (based on the anticipated withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan).84 In 
another case,85 the Full Federal Court found that the Tribunal should have 
considered the impact on the applicant of escalating political violence linked to 
possible elections in 12–18 months’ time (from when the applicant lodged his 
protection application in May 2010). The Court noted that ‘the Tribunal did not 
assess in any real or active way what the situation would be in mid to late 2011 or 
thereafter’.86 
The Full Federal Court has acknowledged that it may be difficult for an 
applicant to persuade a decision-maker that there is a real chance of persecution if 
it will not materialise ‘for some time after his or her return’.87 Even so, for a 
decision-maker to apply the correct test, ‘it may be necessary to consider whether 
the applicant’s fear of being persecuted in the more distant future (and not merely 
in the period shortly after his or her return) is well-founded’;88 ‘a month-by-month 
assessment’ is a reviewable error.89 Indeed, the Federal Court has repeatedly 
confirmed that a decision-maker may be in error where, in rejecting the applicant’s 
claim, he or she looks only to the near future and relies on a lack of evidence of a 
current threat.90 This is because the Tribunal ‘must not foreclose reasonable 
speculation about the chances of the hypothetical future event occurring’,91 which 
																																																								
82 AIE15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 451, [14] (emphasis in original). See also the 
approach in SZGHS (n 52) [28]. 
83 QAAH (n 41) 391 [108]: it was ‘necessary to estimate how confidently any non-Taliban settlement 
can be predicted to endure, on a widespread basis, for a period of some years.’ See also CDC15 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 18 (‘CDC15’). 
84 AUK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1872, [42]. See also 
MZZXD (n 70) [69] and CDC15 (n 83) [44], in which the Court stated that decision-makers should 
have assessed protection claims by Hazaras from Afghanistan in light of the likely withdrawal of 
international troops in one to two years’ time, which would have an adverse effect on their security. 
85 MZYTS (n 70). 
86 Ibid 444 [39] (emphasis added). 
87 NAGT of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 
319, [22]. 
88 Ibid. 
89 NACZ (n 70) [38]. 
90 See, eg, SZGHS (n 52) [28]. 
91 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220, 239 [60]. See 
also MZXSA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 117 ALD 441, 460–61 [94]; 
EMX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 284, [16]. But this was 
extended to not foreclosing ‘reasonable speculation about the chances of the hypothetical future 
event not occurring’ in SZVKA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 320 FLR 
453, 461 [33] (emphasis in original). 
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involves ‘speculation as to circumstances in the future on the basis of material in 
the present, and what has happened to the person in the past’.92 
In Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 
(No 1), the Federal Court reviewed a decision in which the decision-maker had 
considered that a real chance of persecution just two months after the applicant’s 
return to Cambodia ‘wasn’t relevant’.93 The Court held that ‘the question of 
whether there was a real chance of persecution necessarily required the delegate to 
look at the future in so far as it was reasonably foreseeable at the time when he was 
making his decision.’94 However, by way of explanation, it added:  
On the one hand the delegate was not required to look at the possibility of 
something occurring in 50 years’ time — to take the example given by Mr 
Paterson to Mr Rose (transcript 2293). On the other hand a delegate errs in 
law, in my opinion, if he confines his attention to whether there is a real 
chance of persecution on the day after an applicant’s return. In my opinion 
on the delegate’s evidence of what he considered, he erred in law.95 
Thus, in this case, two months was considered too short a period; more broadly it 
was agreed that 50 years into the future was too long and one day was too confined. 
There have been cases where decision-makers have considered a period of 
several years as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’. In one case, the Tribunal found 
that an applicant aged in his 40s had a well-founded fear of persecution because of 
the risk he would be called up for reserve military service (mandatory to age 51) 
were he to return to Israel. There was evidence that men over 35 years of age often 
were not called up for reserve training as they were considered medically unfit, and 
were usually discharged at the age of 41 or 45. However, there was ‘no clear 
indication that the applicant would not be called up if he returned to Israel until the 
age of 51’;96 thus, although this was some years away, the Tribunal found that there 
was a real chance it could occur within the reasonably foreseeable future. 
In sum, the cases discussed above support a non-prescriptive, flexible 
approach by the Australian courts (much less so by the Tribunal) to the notion of 
time in refugee status determination. This approach treats a ‘reasonably foreseeable 
future’ as open-ended, permits reasonable speculation and is attuned to the 
importance of context in refugee cases. 
Parts V(B)–(E) below highlight four specific contexts where an open-ended 
approach to the future may be particularly appropriate. 
																																																								
92 MZYTS (n 70) 443 [33] (citations omitted). In that case, it was noted that a decision-maker could rely 
on information that was ‘several years old … as part of a weighing process’ helping them decide 
‘which information best and most reliably supports the prediction of future risk’: at 452 [74]. 
93 Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 1) (1993) 47 FCR 1, 66 
(‘Mok (No 1)’). 
94 Ibid. See also MOK (n 31). 
95 Mok (No 1) (n 93) 66. See also MOK (n 31). 
96 1001683 [2010] RRTA 506, [75] (emphasis added). 
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B Children 
In cases involving minor applicants, there is an especially strong case for taking a 
longer-range view of prospective harm. This is well accepted, particularly in cases 
involving the risk of female genital mutilation. This is also the case where the type 
of harm feared entails the denial of socio-economic rights, such as health care or 
education, or cumulative harm, which in itself is often assessed over a longer 
period (sometimes a lifetime).97 As the guidelines of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) on child asylum claims emphasise: 
While it is clear that not all discriminatory acts leading to the deprivation of 
economic, social and cultural rights necessarily equate to persecution, it is 
important to assess the consequences of such acts for each child concerned, 
now and in the future.98 
A good example of this approach in Australian jurisprudence is found in a 
case concerning the potential risk to an Ethiopian child of being subjected to 
corporal punishment at school. At the time of the decision, the child was still a 
toddler, yet the Tribunal accepted a period of at least a decade as the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable future’: 
I find that the reasonably foreseeable future does not extend beyond the 
applicant’s primary education [through to the age of 15 years], as anything 
beyond is dependent upon too many variables, including possible changes to 
government and the child’s own interests and abilities to pursue further 
studies.99 
Although, in this case, the Tribunal felt the need to impose an outer limit on 
the timeframe, it nonetheless adopted an appropriately longer-range view. 
C Slow-Onset Impacts of Climate Change 
As noted above, the Federal Court of Australia in Mok (No 1) stated (in obiter 
dicta) that a decision-maker ‘was not required to look at the possibility of 
something occurring in 50 years’ time’.100 Presumably, this was on account of the 
potential for mitigating factors that might reduce or nullify the risk of harm.101 
However, how should a decision-maker factor in scientific evidence that weighs 
very strongly in favour of certain risks manifesting over time — and certainly at a 
sufficient level to meet the well-founded fear threshold in refugee law?102 
																																																								
97 We are grateful to Kate Jastram for this point. See also for more detailed discussion of these issues: 
Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
98 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under Article 1(A)2 and 
1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc 
HCR/GIP/09/08 (22 December 2009) 15 [36] (emphasis added). 
99 1703914 (Refugee) (n 71) [75]. 
100 Mok (No 1) (n 93) 66. See also MOK (n 31). 
101 1703914 (Refugee) (n 71) [75]. See also 1319201 [2014] RRTA 835, [33] (‘1319201’); 1314106 
[2014] RRTA 796, [30] (‘1314106’). 
102 This was, in effect, acknowledged in AF (Kiribati) (n 12) [90], where the Tribunal observed that 
the concept of an ‘imminent’ risk to life … requires no more than sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds for believing the appellant would be in danger. In other words, 
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This is particularly pertinent to cases involving the slower-onset impacts of 
climate change. As noted above, such cases may enliven states’ international 
protection obligations, which necessarily involve an assessment of whether or not 
a well-founded fear of harm (or real risk of harm, in human rights law) has been 
established. When it comes to climate change itself, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (‘IPCC’), which is the expert UN body for assessing the 
science related to climate change, has predicted with ‘very high confidence’103 
impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, 
floods, cyclones, and wildfires,104 and increased risks in urban areas for people, 
assets, economies and ecosystems, including from heat stress, storms and extreme 
precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water 
scarcity, sea level rise and storm surges.105 The IPCC has noted with ‘high 
confidence’ that low-lying areas are at risk from sea-level rise, which will 
continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilised,106 and that 
it is virtually certain that global mean sea-level rise will continue for many 
centuries beyond 2100 (the amount will depend on future emissions).107 At the 
same time, the IPCC has acknowledged (with ‘very high confidence’ and ‘high 
confidence’, respectively) that ‘[i]nnovation and investments in environmentally 
sound infrastructure and technologies can reduce GHG [greenhouse gas] 
emissions and enhance resilience to climate change’108 and ‘[t]ransformations in 
economic, social, technological and political decisions and actions can enhance 
adaptation and promote sustainable development’.109 That said, such mitigation 
and adaptation measures remain uncertain,110 and they do not detract from the 
current trajectory of adverse climate change impacts. Hence, a longer timeframe 
for assessing risk may be particularly suited to the context of slow-onset of 
climate change in order to capture both real risk and mitigating measures. Context 
is key, and the rules cannot be too prescriptive: in refugee law, the focus is not on 
certainty of harm, but whether there is a real risk of it.111 The competing 
																																																																																																																																
these standards should be seen as largely synonymous requiring something akin to the refugee 
‘real chance’ standard. That is to say, something which is more than above mere speculation 
and conjecture, but sitting below the civil balance of probability standard. 
103 A combination of the IPCC’s evaluation of the underlying scientific evidence, and the degree of 
expert agreement about it, determines the level of ‘confidence’ ascribed, which ranges from ‘very 
low’ to ‘very high’. Confidence in the ‘validity of a finding [is] based on the type, amount, quality 
and consistency of evidence (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models, expert 
judgment) and on the degree of agreement’: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (‘IPCC’), 
Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report (Report, 2014) 121. The term ‘virtually certain’ means that 
the probability is 99–100%: at 2. 
104 Ibid 8. 
105 Ibid 15. 
106 Ibid 13. 
107 Ibid 16. 
108 Ibid 26 (emphasis omitted). 
109 Ibid 20 (emphasis omitted). 
110 While, in some cases, uncertainty about mitigating factors has led decision-makers to deny the 
protection claim, in others, it has worked in the applicant’s favour — while conditions may 
improve, they also may not (and the applicant should, in effect, be given the benefit of the doubt): 
see 1515485 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 724; 1605348 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 785. 
111 We are reminded of Lord Diplock’s cautionary statement in the 1971 extradition case of Fernandez 
v Government of Singapore [1971] 2 All ER 691, 696–7, in which his Lordship explained that:  
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possibilities therefore need to be assessed in light of this standard. A mere 
possibility of intervention or potential mitigating developments may not be 
sufficient to reduce an existing real risk (albeit one that will manifest in the 
distant future). 
D Armed Conflict 
Armed conflict is another context in which arguments have been made for 
extending the timeframe. There are two lines of argument. First, the effects of 
armed conflict on civilians are indirect as well as direct, and the indirect effects 
(food insecurity, lack of essential healthcare, and so on) often take time to manifest 
at scale.112 
Second, armed conflicts are usually volatile in terms of severity and 
geographic scope,113 such that areas previously considered safe become conflict-
affected.114 The point has been noted by the Tribunal in the case of Afghanistan, for 
instance,115 and appears to cause consternation for decision-makers applying the 
‘reasonably foreseeable future’ test. There is a tendency in some cases to curtail the 
‘reasonably foreseeable future’ to a relatively short period because of the fluidity of 
the situation and uncertainty over variables involved.116 For example: 
Whilst the Tribunal accepts that Islamic State has made threats against Shias 
in Pakistan, particularly in Parachinar and Hangu, the Tribunal considers 
that the potential for Islamic State to infiltrate or increase its presence in 
Pakistan remains uncertain. The Tribunal considers that the applicant’s 
claims in relation to this issue are highly speculative given the variables 
																																																																																																																																
There is no general rule of English law that when a court is required, either by statute or at 
common law, to take account of what may happen in the future and to base legal consequences 
on the likelihood of its happening, it must ignore any possibility of something happening merely 
because the odds on its happening are fractionally less than evens. … The degree of risk should 
be an important factor in the court’s decision, whether it is more or less than 50 per cent. 
112 Hélène Lambert and Theo Farrell, ‘The Changing Character of Armed Conflict and the 
Implications for Refugee Protection Jurisprudence’ (2010) 22(2) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 237, highlighting that the indirect effects often are more deadly on the civilian population (ie, 
refugees) than the direct effects of armed conflict. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on International 
Protection No. 12: Claims for Refugee Status related to Situations of Armed Conflict and Violence 
under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the Regional Refugee Definitions, UN Doc HCR/GIP/16/12 (2 December 2016), 5 [19] 
(‘Guidelines on Armed Conflict’). 
113 Guidelines on Armed Conflict, UN Doc HCR/GIP/16/12 (n 112) 6 [25]. 
114 Theo Farrell and Olivier Schmitt, ‘The Causes, Character and Conduct of Internal Armed Conflict 
and the Effects on Civilian Populations, 1990–2010’ in Volker Türk, Alice Edwards and Cornelius 
Wouters (eds), In Flight from Conflict and Violence: UNHCR’s Consultations on Refugee Status 
and Other Forms of International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 25. See also Paul 
Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About 
It (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
115 See, eg, 1215343 [2013] RRTA 240, [66]; 1213298 [2013] RRTA 43, [54]; 1217298 [2013] RRTA 
81, [138]. 
116 1703914 (Refugee) (n 71) [88]. See also DPM16 (n 19) [9]: ‘The fluidity of the political situation 
was directly relevant to that chance [of harm].’ This approach is also sometimes applied in contexts 
other than armed conflict: see 1601317 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 2740. 
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involved such as actions that may be taken by the Pakistan state, 
neighbouring countries or Western countries.117 
An alternative approach would have been for the decision-maker to discuss the 
trajectory of Islamic State’s military gains against the already known actions of 
neighbouring or other countries, in order to assess the risk to the applicant based on 
these conflict trends. 
The foreclosure of reasonable speculation about future events is reflected in 
PAM3, which states: ‘If a receiving country is subject to a violent political 
environment, events may change rapidly and the foreseeable future may be 
limited’.118 This general statement warrants scrutiny, as it does not make clear what 
is the implication of a violent political environment. While a rapidly changing 
environment might add to the complexity of a person’s experience and perception 
of risk, this statement from PAM3 should not be equated with an automatic 
shortening of the future window. Rather, existing authority supports the notion that 
volatility might increase the risk to the applicant in some cases and certainly 
requires a longer-frame assessment.119 For instance, in Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs v Jama, a majority of the Full Federal Court of Australia 
noted the importance of taking into account the possibility of changing 
circumstances, particularly in a fluid situation, such as that in Somalia.120 Even 
though there may be no current risk of persecution, ‘a change in circumstances 
may readily be foreseen that would create a significant risk of persecution’.121 
However, in cases involving the withdrawal of international troops from 
Afghanistan in 2014, some decision-makers took the withdrawal to suggest an 
increased risk based on predictions about the security situation post-2014,122 while 
others did not.123 
Signs that conditions might be improving should also be treated with 
caution since they may not be sustainable over the longer term.124 Thus, in 
1703914 (Refugee), the Tribunal reasoned: 
																																																								
117 1314106 (n 101) [30]. See also 1319201 (n 101) [33] containing the same reasoning by the same 
decision-maker in relation to the risk from Islamic State in Pakistan. 
118 PAM3 (n 69) [7.2]. 
119 Guidelines on Armed Conflict, UN Doc HCR/GIP/16/12 (n 112) 6 [25]. 
120 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jama [1999] FCA 1680, [24], [29]. 
121 Ibid [24] (Branson and Sackville JJ). See also DUX16 (n 19) [14]. 
122 In CDC15 (n 83) [36], Charlesworth J noted that: 
The predictive and speculative function of the Tribunal could not be properly discharged without 
assessing and dealing with the appellant’s assertions that the troops would withdraw as predicted, 
that the Taliban would assume increased control as predicted, and that the chance of him being 
persecuted, or the risk that he would suffer serious harm, would be elevated as a result. 
See also MZZXD (n 70) [69]; 1215016 (n 69) [107]. 
123 SZTUI (n 70) [28]; 1220489 [2013] RRTA 292, [134]. 
124 See Linda Kirk, ‘The Concept of Imminence in Refugee Law: Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(Migration and Refugee Division)’ (Conference Paper, Expert Workshop on the Concept of 
‘Imminence’ in the International Protection of Refugees and Other Forced Migrants, 20 August 
2018) [8]. See also 1703914 (Refugee) (n 71) [88]. In the context of art 1C(5) of the Refugee 
Convention, it has been stated that the contemplated change in circumstances must ‘have some 
degree of permanency, at least in the context of future foreseeable events’: V04/17240 [2004] 
RRTA 52. 
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With such a rapidly changing political landscape it is difficult for the 
Tribunal to base a decision on probative material when so little is known and 
so many changes are occurring. It is possible that the political situation 
regresses. It is possible that the changes are cosmetic to the larger security 
apparatus and how it operates. It is possible that the country will reduce its 
heavy handedness. As such while acknowledging these changing 
circumstances I find that they cannot provide a basis upon which to ground a 
decision which projects into the reasonably foreseeable future.125 
In assessing the durability of changes in Afghanistan in the context of the 
cessation clause in art 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, the Tribunal’s reasoning 
in V04/17240 provided an interesting insight into how future contingencies should 
be assessed in light of past and present circumstances: 
(i) … given the history of unrest in that country and apparent growing 
reluctance of the international community to make a long term and extensive 
commitment to securing some level of stability to the region it is premature 
to assume that anything has happened to date that would found a basis for 
confidence that the human rights situation in general in Afghanistan and the 
political dynamics which resulted in the persecution of the applicant in 
particular have materially changed so far as the short to mid term future of 
the nation is concerned. … 
(vii) Until effective new state structures are installed in Afghanistan, it 
would be premature to assert that the applicant no longer faces persecution 
in the reasonably foreseeable future …126 
Logically, there is no reason why such analysis should be limited to 
cessation cases and not also apply to claims for refugee status: the two provisions, 
arts 1A(2) and 1C(5), are related. In V04/17240, the Tribunal (correctly in our view) 
considered the history of unrest and instability in Afghanistan, its human rights 
situation in general, and the absence of effective new state structures and permanent 
reform (that would indicate a safer future) over and above the many (volatile) 
changes in the political and military landscape in Afghanistan. Such a longer-frame 
assessment is appropriate in assessing refugee claims involving armed conflict. 
E Health Deterioration 
Analogous issues have arisen in cases concerning the future health of applicants 
and the absence of appropriate medical treatment in the country of origin. In one 
matter, 1008364, involving an HIV-positive applicant from Indonesia, medical 
evidence suggested that the applicant was clinically stable and not ‘at imminent 
risk of death whilst taking the current medications’, but he would be ‘likely to 
endure a significant reduction in health status and a significantly increased risk of 
death if he were to return to Indonesia where access to the required treatment is 
																																																								
125 See 1703914 (Refugee) (n 71) [88]. See also other cases where the future possibility of improving 
circumstances did not affect the finding of risk based on the existing circumstances: 1515485 
(Refugee) (n 110); 1605348 (Refugee) (n 110). 
126 V04/17240 (n 124) (emphasis added). It could be argued that referring to the future of a ‘nation’ 
may imply a year-long timeframe, given how long it can take for systemic changes such as those 
outlined here to be realised. See also V03/16047 (n 80), which involved the same decision-maker 
and same reasoning. 
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unavailable’.127 The Tribunal found that while the Indonesian authorities were 
striving to provide appropriate care to people with HIV/AIDS, ‘their efforts [we]re 
hampered by, among other problems, a lack of resources, a recent decentralisation 
of the health sector, and by limited effectiveness in delivering basic health care 
services, especially to the poor’.128 Although a lack of appropriate medical 
treatment ‘would not occur as a result of discrimination but because of the lack of 
resources and endemic problems within the health service’, the end result would be 
that the applicant would have to rely on his family and community ‘to ensure his 
survival’.129 As such, the Tribunal found that  
the hardship the applicant is likely to incur in the foreseeable future if he 
returns to Indonesia and is unable to access appropriate treatment, threatens 
his capacity to subsist, and therefore amounts to persecution in a Convention 
sense (s 91R(2) of the Act).130 
Another matter, 0903707, concerned a Vietnamese applicant with HIV and 
Hepatitis B who claimed that he would be unable to access necessary medical 
treatment on return to Vietnam and would die within three to five years.131 His 
family had disowned him because of his illness and he said that he would have no 
means of support. He also feared being ostracised and unable to find work or 
accommodation on account of the stigma associated with his illnesses. The 
Tribunal was provided with medical evidence that he ‘would be at risk of death in 
the short to medium term with the last months or years of his short life likely to be 
made more miserable because of discrimination.’132 Even though there was anti-
discrimination legislation in place in Vietnam, the Tribunal considered that ‘the 
Vietnamese government’s laws and policies regarding HIV/AIDS ha[d] not been 
effectively or uniformly implemented across the country, especially in rural areas 
such as Ca Mau’ and ‘there was little evidence that the social change required to 
minimize stigma and discrimination had occurred in remote rural areas like the 
applicant’s home area.’133 The Tribunal found that the applicant had a well-
founded fear of persecution given there was  
a real chance that, if he returns to Vietnam now or in the reasonably 
foreseeable future, the applicant will face discrimination and stigmatisation 
which will deny him access to basic services and the capacity to earn a 
livelihood of any kind such that it threatens his capacity to subsist …134 
These cases underline the importance of a contextual analysis, in which the 
intensity, severity and nature of future harm, based on its foreseeability in light of 
the individual’s circumstances, are the crucial factors.135 Although the temporal 
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proximity of a potential event is not determinative of the likelihood of its 
occurrence, it is a contextual factor to be considered. Thus, if a threat is likely to 
manifest very soon, it may be easier for an individual to argue that he or she faces 
a real chance of being harmed, since there may be less opportunity for mitigating 
factors to intervene. By contrast, a threat in the more distant future might be able to 
be allayed or diminished through intervening measures. However, the decision-
maker must weigh up the likelihood of the risk with any mitigation eventuating, 
rather than simply dismissing the risk as too speculative.136 Even so, if the risk of 
harm is distant but very real — as in each of the four specific contexts discussed in 
this Part — then protection may well be required. 
VI Conclusion 
It is widely understood that the well-founded fear test in refugee law requires some 
speculation in light of its forward-looking and predictive nature. Yet, the requisite 
timeframe involved in an assessment of well-founded fear is rarely examined. It is 
an error of law to suggest that protection is only forthcoming where (risk of) harm 
is imminent, yet this notion has started to creep into refugee status decision-
making, usually without explicit examination or reflection.137 
Australian courts and tribunals are notable for being singularly attuned to 
the relevance of time in refugee law and, in particular, in identifying the need for a 
flexible, longer-frame, assessment of future harm. Yet, as this article has revealed, 
even in this jurisdiction, decision-makers still sometimes struggle with the 
appropriate frame of reference. This suggests that the issue of time requires explicit 
scholarly and judicial analysis, so as to safeguard against inappropriately narrow 
approaches that may result in a rejection of refugee status even where a person 
faces a well-founded fear of persecution, albeit not immediately on return. 
This article constitutes the first analysis of the approach of Australian courts 
and tribunals in examining the relevant timeframe involved in a well-founded fear 
assessment. It identified that the accepted position is one that is forward-looking, 
from the date of determination, into the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’. That 
timeframe is open-ended (an ‘indefinite period’) and must not be confined (for 
instance, to impending events). Decisions (notably by the Tribunal) that conflict 
with this authoritative position are erroneous. The article highlighted four specific 
contexts in which there is a particularly strong case for a longer timeframe: claims 
in relation to children, slow-onset impacts of climate change, armed conflict, and 
health deterioration. 
It is hoped that the considered and insightful Australian jurisprudence 
examined in this article may provide the basis for the formulation of an 
appropriately inclusive approach to assessing well-founded fear in other 
jurisdictions in which the issue of time is far less developed. In light of 
contemporary protection challenges, the need for an open-ended approach to the 
timing of harm in refugee law is more important than ever. 
																																																								
136 See 1314106 (n 101) [30]; 1319201 (n 101) [33]. 
137 See generally Anderson et al (n 10). 
